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The Pennsylvania Estate Tax: Is It
Unconstitutional?
I. Introduction
The Pennsylvania estate tax' has been in force in its present
form 2 for over twenty years. Since its inception 3 and through its sub-
sequent modifications4 the estate tax has been based on the credit for
state death taxess provided in the federal estate tax. Its continuing
purpose is to secure for Pennsylvania the full benefit of the federal
state death tax credit.6
Challenges to the constitutional validity of the Pennsylvania es-
tate tax have proven unsuccessful.7 The failure of these actions,
however, cannot be attributed to the constitutional soundness of the
tax, since Pennsylvania courts have never reached the merits of that
issue. Rather, in each instance, the courts have denied the taxpayer-
litigant standing to assert the alleged constitutional infirmities.'
1. 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1717(a) (Purdon Supp. 1983) provides:
Residents.-In the event that a Federal estate tax is payable to the United States on
the estate of a decedent who was a resident of this Commonwealth at the time of his
death and the inheritance tax, if any, paid to the Commonwealth (disregarding inter-
est or the amount of any discount allowed under section 1742 (relating to payment
date and discount)), plus the death taxes (not including any death tax expressly im-
posed to receive the benefit of the credit for state death taxes allowed by the Federal
estate tax law) paid to other states or territories in respect to the property of the
decedent, is less than the maximum credit for state taxs allowed by the Federal estate
tax law, a tax equal to the difference is imposed.
The Inheritance and Estate Tax Act of 1982 repealed the Inheritance and Estate Tax Act
of 1961. The language of§ 1717(a) is nearly identical to the previous estate tax codified in PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2485-421 (Purdon 1964).
2. States may levy one or both of two types of death taxes. One type, normally referred
to as an inheritance tax, has no relation to the federal credit for state death taxes. The other
type, normally referred to as an estate tax, is designed to absorb the difference, if any, between
the federal credit for state death taxes and the state's inheritance tax.
Not all states that levy a tax based upon the federal credit denominate their tax as an
estate tax. Nevertheless, whether denominated as inheritance or an estate tax, they generally
are referred to as "pick-up," "slack" or "sponge" taxes. As used throughout this comment the
term "death tax" will refer to state succession, transfer or legacy taxes imposed on decedents'
estates, whether levied as an estate or inheritance tax.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2303 (repealed 1961).
4. See infra notes 40-57 and accompanying text.
5. I.R.C. § 2011 (1982).
6. See In re Knowle's Estate, 295 Pa. 571, 145 A. 797 (1929); Baker's Estate, I Pa. Fiduc.
2d 414 (Orphan's Ct., Allegheny County 1980), aff dper curiam, reh'g denied, 495 Pa. 337, 433
A.2d 1337 (1981).
7. See infra notes 193-202 and accompanying text.
8. See supra note 6.
This comment will identify and examine the bases for federal
and state constitutional challenges9 to the Pennsylvania estate tax.
Following a preliminary discussion of relevant case law, the com-
ment will analyze the estate tax in light of these decisions.' ° Next,
the grounds upon which an estate may obtain standing to assert the
constitutional challenges will be explored and the outcome postu-
lated. " Finally, the possibility of restructuring the estate tax to con-
form to state and federal constitutional limitations will be
presented. 12
II. History and Operation of the Federal Credit for State Death
Taxes
A. Evolution of the Credit
In 1916, the federal government imposed an estate tax on the
passing of certain property upon the death of the owner. 13 Response
to this tax was not altogether unpredictable. Numerous states began
a vociferous condemnation of what they considered to be congres-
sional intrusion into an area of legislation traditionally reserved to
state legislatures.In Other states, seeking to capitalize on the resent-
ment aroused by this double tax burden on estates, repealed their
death taxes in an overt attempt to lure the wealthy within their
borders. "5
In 1924, Congress, in the face of continuing state pressure, en-
acted an unprecedented credit against the federal estate tax. 16 The
credit permitted decedent's estates to deduct the lesser of twenty-five
percent of the federal estate tax, or the full amount of state death
9. See infra sections III and IV.
10. See infra sections III and IV.
11. See infra section V.
12. See infra section VI.
13. Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 468, § 201, 29 Stat. 77 (current version at I.R.C. § 2001
(1982)).
14. See Cogburn, The Credit Allowable Against the Basic Federal Estate Tax For Death
Taxes Paid to State Statutes Enacted to Take Advantage Thereof- Constitutional Doicully and
Some Suggested Solutions 30 N.C. L. REV. 123 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Cogburn].
15. An advertisement published by the Alabama Power Company declared as follows:
No Inheritance Tax Under Alabama Constitution. Not only has Alabama no Income
Tax nor Inheritance Tax but the framers of the Alabama Constitution have gone so
far as to make sure that No Inheritance Tax can be Levied by the Alabama legisla-
ture on estates left to lineal descendants. Alabama Is the Only State of Industrial
Vantage which Has Neither Income Nor Inheritance Tax. Profits made in Alabama
Pass to Heirs!
Perkins, State Action Under the Federal Estate Tax Credit Clause, 13 N.C. L. REV. 271 (1935)
[hereinafter cited as Perkins].
16. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 301(b), 43 Stat. 253, 305. This act, the forerunner of
current I.R.C. § 2011 (1982), provided in pertinent part, as follows:
The [estate] tax imposed by this section shall be credited with the amount of any
estate, inheritance, legacy, or succession taxes paid any state, territory, or the District
of Columbia with respect to any property included in the gross estate. The credit
allowed by this subdivision shall not exceed 25 percent of the tax imposed by this
section.
taxes paid. Congress enacted the credit to diminish criticism that the
federal government had usurped the states' traditional domain of
levying death taxes. Further, the credit was intended to be a deter-
rent to tax slashing competition among the states.17
The credit engendered a swift response by a number of state
legislatures, including Pennsylvania's.'" These states amended or
supplemented their existing inheritance or estate taxes to take advan-
tage of the opportunity to increase revenue without additional cost to
decedents' estates.' 9 Recognizing that the advantage of the credit
would be lost if the "normal" death tax did not equal or exceed the
federal credit, the states enacted new taxes that "picked-up" the dif-
ference, if any, between the normal state death tax and the twenty-
five percent federal credit. The resulting increase in state tax liabil-
ity imposed no greater overall tax burden on the estate. Rather, the
tax merely rerouted revenue otherwise destined for the federal treas-
ury into the states' coffers.2°
Unfortunately, the congressional goal of uniformity among state
death taxes did not result because of the relatively low percentage of
the federal estate tax offered as the credit. Frequently, the inheri-
tance or estate taxes imposed by the states exceeded the value of the
credit.2 Consequently, the credit did not provide sufficient benefits
17. The testimony of E. D. Chessell, representing the Mortgage Investment Bankers As-
sociation of America, was indicative of the state of affairs:
There was quite an agitation last winter in many of the states in favor of following
the example of Florida and repealing their state inheritance taxes. One state, Ne-
vada, did repeal its tax. The matter was agitated in California and a bill was intro-
duced in the Legislature of Ohio to have its tax repealed. It was also considered in
Colorado...
Perkins, supra note 15, at 272 (citing Hearings on Revenue Revision, Committee on Ways and
Means 440 (1925)).
18. New York and Georgia were among the states that quickly passed statutes based on
the federal estate tax credit provision. See 1925 N.Y. Laws 320; 1925 Ga. Laws 63. The New
York law absorbed the credit only on large estates. The Georgia statute provided for one
death tax in the amount of the federal credit.
19. Seelnre Estate of Thalman, 177 Misc. 1055, 32 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1941). In 1925, New
York's inheritance tax exceeded the value of the federal credit in small estates. To receive full
advantage of the federal credit, the state then supplemented its inheritance tax to provide that,
in the case of larger estates, tax liability would equal the value of the federal credit.
20. Some state legislatures did not approve of the federal credit for state death taxes.
Thus, many western states with vast mineral deposits believed that they were not receiving a
fair share of the federal revenue realized from the estate tax. They argued that a decedent's
state of domicile should not receive the full benefit of the credit, for, in many instances, the
decedent had accumulated his wealth in a state or states other than that of domicile. Conse-
quently they felt that federal estate tax benefits should have been distributed more evenly
among those states responsible for the decedent's wealth.
Other states espoused the view that the federal government was coercing them into enact-
ing death taxes. States that taxed decedent's estates received a privlege by means of the credit
that Congress did not offer to those states that chose not to take the transfer of decedent's
estates. Enactment of the credit seemed to dictate that these states must in turn either enact
death taxes to obtain the credit's benefit or lose revenue to the federal government. See gener-
ally Perkins, supra note 15.
2 1. Excess of state imposed death taxes over the federal credit was evident in New York,
where the newly enacted pick-up tax applied only to estates valued in excess of $1,000,000. See
supra note 18.
to deter owners of wealthy estates from establishing domicile in
states with minimal death taxation; some states continued to levy
insignificant death taxes on decedents' estates. 22 Because of the po-
tential advantage of a smaller tax burden on estates, these states
maintained their attractiveness to the tax conscious.
Congress reacted to this by revising the estate tax law again in
1926, more than tripling the value of the credit for state death
taxes.23 As a consequence the incidence of state death taxes exceed-
ing the credit diminished dramatically.24 States that had been reluc-
tant to act in the wake of the previous credit, or had found action
unnecessary because their tax usually exceeded the credit, no longer
hesitated. A steady profusion of states enacted statutes to absorb the
differential that existed between their normal death tax and the fed-
eral credit.25
By increasing the credit's value, Congress partially realized its
goal of fostering state death taxing uniformity. The larger credit en-
abled states to increase revenue by raising death taxes without in-
flicting an additional burden on estates. The increase also rendered
tax-slashing self-defeating. Thus, if a state persisted in levying a
minimal death tax, decedents' estates would receive no tax advan-
tage, and the state would recognize little revenue from transfer of the
property at death. An estate still would have federal estate tax liabil-
ity, and thus the allure of tax-slashing states to wealthy potential res-
idents no longer existed.26
During the Depression when the federal treasury was in dire
straits, Congress turned to the estate tax as a source of additional
22. Presently only Nevada fails to impose a tax on the transfer of property at death. For
a complete profile of all state inheritance and estate taxes, see 5 INH*ER. EST. & GIFr TAX REP.
(CCH) 1100.
23. 26 U.S.C. § 1093 (1926). The 1926 federal estate tax revision raised the amount of
the credit from 25% to 80% of the federal estate tax.
24. State representatives who had objected to the 25% credit became more incensed after
the 1926 revision. States imposing death taxes captured a greater share of money from their
decedents' estates rather than participating in a more equitable distribution of this revenue by
the federal government.
25. In 1926, Georgia, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island,
and Virginia increased their death taxes to take full advantage of the larger credit. California,
Colorado, Delaware, Maine, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania and
Vermont followed in 1927. Within the next five years, nineteen additional states enacted estate
taxes enabling them to take advantage of the 80% credit.
26. The following example illustrates the uselessness of tax-slashing under the 1926 revi-
sion. Assume that in 1983 an individual owns a $4,000,000 estate located in Nevada, which
has no death taxes. The federal estate tax is $1,875,800 and the maximum credit for state
death taxes equals $280,400. The estate thus pays a tax of $1,875,800, and Nevada would
receive no benefit from the transfer of the property. An identically valued estate in Alabama
would have the same aggregate tax liability. Alabama, however, levies a death tax in the
amount of the federal credit. ALA. CODE § 40-15-2 (1975 & Supp. 1982). The estate then
would pay $280,400 to Alabama and the remainder, $1,595,400, to the federal government.
This system imposes no additional tax burden on the estate and enables Alabama to realize a
sizeable revenue gain on the property's transfer.
revenue. 27 Since many states had enacted tax laws based upon the
federal credit, Congress balked at changing the credit and instead,
enacted an additional estate tax that allowed no credit for state death
taxes.28 This dual system persisted until the 1954 Code merged the
two taxes and allowed a credit for state death taxes against the com-
bined tax.29
B. Computation of the Federal Credit for State Death Taxes
The maximum credit for state death taxes is determined from
the tables codified in section 2011 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code.3°
To ascertain the amount of the credit, the taxpayer first must deter-
mine the value of the gross estate.3 1  Subtracting any deductions
available to the estate from the value of the gross estate yields the
taxable estate.32 Reducing the taxable estate by $60,000 produces
the adjusted taxable estate that, when mechanically applied to the
table, establishes the maximum allowed federal credit.33
Estates do not receive the full value of the state death credit
automatically. Rather the credit extends only to those state death
taxes actually paid and claimed within four years of filing of the
federal estate return. 34  The death tax credit does not include any
27. Rather than abolishing the federal credit, which would have injured the states as
much as it would have benefited the federal treasury, Congress added a second estate tax to
increase revenue. See infra notes 28-29.
28. 26 U.S.C. §§ 935, 936(a) (1939).
29. 26 U.S.C. § 2011 (1954). Section 2011(d) of the 1982 Code refers to the "basic estate
tax" as 125% of the maximum credit allowed under the Revenue Act of 1926. Congress de-
rived the 125% figure from the previous credit of 4/5 of the tax, granted under the 1926 Act.
The inverse of 4/5 is 5/4; thus, 125% of the credit constituted the tax. The "additional estate
tax" due is the difference between the basic estate tax and the tax imposed currently under
I.R.C. §§ 2002 and 2101.
30. The Code provides for a graduated credit, the marginal rate increasing from a mini-
mum of .8% to a maximum of 16%. Fixing the credit at 1926 levels has diminished greatly the
amount of savings provided to an estate by the 80% credit. Although a larger estate is neces-
sary today to generate federal estate tax liability, those estates with federal liability receive a
proportionally smaller credit than they previously received under the 1926 Act. This tax con-
sequence results from the escalation of federal estate tax rates in light of the credit's fixed
amount. Consequently, the pick-up taxes of many states do not operate unless the estate's
value is large. This result is also a function of higher state inheritance taxes, culminating in the
exact situation that existed after enactment of the 25% credit. States have not resumed their
tax-slashing competition, apparently out of the need to retain the revenue generated by their
death taxes. Many states, however, do limit their death tax to the credit's value. Eg., see
ALA. CODE § 40-15-2 (1975 & Supp. 1982); ALASKA STAT. § 43.31.011 (1977); TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 211.051 (Vernon 1982).
31. I.R.C. § 2031 (1982) defines gross estate.
32. The following Code sections illustrate some deductions available to estates: I.R.C.
§ 2052 (1982) allows deductions for various expenses including funeral costs and costs of ad-
ministering the decedent's estate; I.R.C. § 2054 (1982) provides a deduction for losses incurred
by casualty during settlement of the estate; I.R.C. § 2055 (1982) provides for charitable
deductions.
33. I.R.C. § 201 l(b) (1982). Computations to establish the maximum allowed federal
credit demonstrate that in 1983 the credit will not be available to estates valued at less than
$325,000.
34. Id. § 2011 (c).
federal estate tax paid a5 or foreign death taxes, which are subject to a
separate credit.36 Also excluded are taxes paid with respect to the
estate of a person other than the decedent. 37 The Code further re-
stricts the credit to taxes imposed on property "included in the gross
estate."38 In every case, the credit claimed by the estate is further
limited by the amount of the federal estate tax imposed by section
2001 of the Code, reduced by the unified credit.39
III. The Pennsylvania Estate Tax-An Overview
The Pennsylvania General Assembly first passed a tax specifi-
cally designed to take advantage of the federal credit for state death
taxes in 1925. o The act was to be effective only as long as the Fed-
eral Revenue Act of 1924 remained in force.4' Assessed as an inheri-
tance tax, the 1925 tax supplemented an already existing death tax
and was to operate only in those circumstances in which the original
tax could be levied.42 The Act required decedents' estates to pay the
greater of the original inheritance tax or a tax equivalent to the max-
imum allowed federal credit granted by the 1924 Act. This supple-
mentary tax insured that Pennsylvania would tax decedents' estates
in at least the amount of the federal credit without adding to the
estates' aggregate tax liability. When the Federal Revenue Act of
1926 succeeded the 1924 Act, the supplementary inheritance tax was
repealed automatically.
Following repeal, the General Assembly enacted a second
"pick-up" tax in 1927,43 again supplementing the inheritance tax but
35. Id § 2011(a).
36. Id. § 2014.
37. See Fletcher, 29 B.T.A. 503 (1932).
38. See Second Nat'l Bank of New Haven v. United States; 422 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1970).
The court interpreted gross estate to mean gross estate for federal purposes. Thus the defini-
tion of gross estate used to determine a state death tax is not applicable. Therefore, an estate
cannot use taxes paid on property included in the estate for state tax purposes, but excluded
from the federal gross estate, to determine the credit for state death taxes that the estate could
claim as paid on its federal return.
39. I.R.C. § 2011(f) (1982).
40. 1925 Pa. Laws 416 (codified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2303 (Purdon
1964)). The relevant portion of the act required as follows:
All taxes imposed by this act shall be imposed under the clear value of the property
subject to the tax and shall in each estate be equal to twenty-five per centum of the
estate tax imposed upon the net estate of such decedent under the provisions of sec-
tion three hundred and one of the Revenue Act of 1924 of the United States, but if
said section of the Revenue Act is repealed or if no tax is imposed on such estate by
said section of said act or if twenty-five percent of the tax imposed by said section
amounts to less than the following rates (reference here to the inheritance tax), then
in either event the taxes imposed by this act shall be at the rate of two per cent upon
property passing to direct heirs and at the rate of ten per cent upon passing to others.
41. See supra note 40.
42. See id
43. Act of May 7, 1927, P.L. 859, § I. The Pennsylvania General Assembly entitled this
Act: "Estate tax in addition to transfer inheritance tax imposed." The text reads in pertinent
part as follows:
[Tihat in order that the Commonwealth may receive the benefit of section three hun-
with a slightly altered method of computation. The tax was com-
puted as the difference between the maximum allowable federal
credit and the amount of any state death taxes levied against an es-
tate." A 1929 amendment4" transformed the tax into an estate tax
and required filing of a copy of the federal estate tax return with the
Register of Wills. A 1931 amendment further refined this filing
requirement.46
The first major legislative amendment to the estate tax occurred
in 1943. 4' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had ruled in 1942 that
an estate having federal estate tax liability but without a Penn-
sylvania inheritance tax liability owed no state estate tax.48 Conse-
quently, the General Assembly amended the tax statute to allow
imposition of the estate tax on every estate subject to federal estate
tax, regardless of any Pennsylvania inheritance tax liability. In
194749 an amending act imposed the tax on every estate which has a
situs in Pennsylvania, in which the decedent was domiciled in Penn-
sylvania, or which contains property, the situs of which is in Penn-
sylvania, if the decedent was a nonresident.
This amendment also established the method by which an estate
should handle the discount given for prompt payment of inheritance
dred and one (b) of the Federal Revenue Act of one thousand nine hundred and
twenty-six, or any other legislation of a similar kind or enacted for a like purpose,
which grants a credit on the Federal estate tax for inheritance taxes and transfer
inheritance taxes paid to the State governments, additional transfer taxes for state
purposes are hereby imposed under the provisions of the transfer inheritance tax laws
of this Commonwealth ...
[Sluch taxes shall be imposed and collected in accordance with the provisions of
the transfer inheritance tax laws of the Commonwealth, in the following cases; viz.
whenever in any estate the total tax paid or payable to the Commonwealth and any
other states or territory, at the rates fixed under the inheritance tax laws, shall be less
than the total credit allowed by the Federal law for taxes paid to the States, then the
tax imposed by this act upon the transfer of such property shall be an amount equal
to the difference between the total credit, allowable by the Federal law for taxes pay-
able to the state governments and the total taxes actually paid or payable to the
Commonwealth and any other state or territory under the inheritance tax laws...
44. An example of Pennsylvania's 1927 tax computation method follows: If the maxi-
mum allowed federal credit for state death taxes was $5000 and the Pennsylvania inheritance
tax was $4000, the $1000 difference would equal the additional estate tax due.
45. Act of May 16, 1929, P.L. 1782, § 1.
46. Act of May 12, 1931, P.L. 114, § I. Any communication by the federal government
with the estate had to be filed with the Register of Wills within 30 days.
47. Act of June 4, 1943, P.L. 864, § ). This act changed the method of computation to the
following:
The aggregate transfer inheritance taxes due under the act to which this act is a sup-
plement shall first be ascertained. To such amount, there shall be added the amount
of any estate, inheritance, legacy, or succession taxes actually paid to any other state
or territory. . . . The sum resulting from such addition shall then be deducted from
an amount equal to the amount of the maximum credit allowable to the estate of the
decedent by the Federal Estate Tax law or laws for inheritance. . ..
The remainder constituted the estate tax.
48. Commonwealth v. Davis' Estate, 345 Pa. 284, 26 A.2d 915 (1942).
49. Act of June 28, 1947, P.L. 1091, § I (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2303 (Pur-
don 1964).
taxes.50 Prior to 1947, the statute allowed estates to ignore the dis-
count when computing the estate tax. Consequently, estates would
claim the entire inheritance tax levied rather than the tax actually
paid. Concurrently, the federal estate tax credit, based on state
death taxes actually paid, made no allowance for state discounts.5
The amendment resolved this conflict by requiring estates, when de-
termining Pennsylvania estate tax liability, to reduce the inheritance
tax levied against them by the discount for prompt payment of the
inheritance tax. The amendment thus rendered the inheritance tax
discount useless to an estate that was subject to the additional estate
tax.5
2
The estate tax remained unchanged until its repeal by the Inher-
itance and Estate Tax Act of 196 1, 3 which enacted a tax essentially
the same as its predecessor. Nevertheless, two basic changes oc-
curred which have remained unaltered by subsequent legislation.
The tax was divided into two independent provisions, one for Penn-
sylvania residents54 and one for nonresidents of the United States.55
Thus, the tax no longer is applicable to residents of other states hold-
ing property within Pennsylvania. Furthermore, the 1961 Act ex-
cludes from the aggregate of state death taxes, which are an offset to
the estate tax, any state death tax expressly designed to receive the
benefit of the federal credit.56
50. 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1742 (Purdon 1983) provides in part as follows: "To the
extent that the inheritance tax is paid within three (3) months after the death of the decedent, a
discount of five (5) percent shall be allowed." See In re Duane's Estate, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 502
(C.P. Phila. 1969) for a construction of this statute under somewhat bizzare circumstances.
51. See Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Driscoll, 50 F. Supp. 949 (W.D. Pa. 1943). The
court held that, in determining liability for the federal estate tax, an estate can receive credit
only for the amount of state inheritance taxes actually paid, not for the amount of the full
assessment.
52. The following example illustrates the 1947 amendment's effect on inheritance tax
discounts. Assume a Pennsylvania inheritance tax assessment of $100,000 against an estate. If
the estate pays this tax within three months, it would receive a refund of $5000. Assume also
that the maximum allowed federal credit for state death taxes is $120,000: Without the dis-
count, the estate would be liable for a total of $120,000 in taxes ($100,000 inheritance tax;
$20,000 estate tax). With the discount, tax liability remains the same ($95,000 inheritance tax
actually paid $25,000 estate tax).
53. See supra notes 1, 4.
54. 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1717(a) (Purdon 1980).
55. The following is the tax on nonresidents:
In the event that a Federal estate tax is payable to the United States on the estate of a
decedent who was not a resident of the United States or its territories at the time of
his death, and the inheritance tax, if any, paid to the Commonwealth. . . is less than
the maximum credit for state taxes allowed by the Federal estate tax law, a tax is
hereby imposed, to be computed by deducting the Pennsylvania inheritance tax, if
any, paid as aforementioned from an amount which bears the same ratio to the maxi-
mum credit for state taxes allowed by the Federal estate tax law, as the transfer of
property subject to inheritance tax under this act and included in the decedent's gross
estatefor Federal estate tax purposes bears to the decedent's gross estate located within
the United States and its territories for Federal estate tax purposes.
Id § 1717(b) (emphasis supplied).
56. Exclusion of taxes designed to receive the benefit of the federal credit expressly over-
rules McKinney Estate, 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 758 (1961), in which the estate was given credit for
taxes paid to Florida even though Florida based its tax on the federal credit. See also Joint
Since the 1961 Act, Pennsylvania computes the estate tax as
follows:
[T]he Pennsylvania Estate Tax is nothing more than the excess of
the maximum Federal Credit over the maximum amount of inher-
itance taxes. Such excess is, however, reducible by any amount of
inheritance tax payable to any other state or states. Thus, the
Pennsylvania inheritance tax is first determined, and added
thereto is the "estate, inheritance, legacy, or succession taxes actu-
ally paid to any other state." The resulting sum is then deducted
from the Federal Credit allowable by the Federal Estate Tax Law,
and the difference is the Estate Tax recoverable. . . . In every
case where Pennsylvania is the domiciliary state, we are entitled to
the full Federal Credit less the deductions above referred, without
apportionment of the Estate Tax.57
Thus, Pennsylvania imposes the estate tax based upon the entire fed-
eral credit even if a portion of the gross estate has a situs outside the
Commonwealth. The power of a state to tax property outside its
borders is of questionable constitutional validity and warrants
scrutiny.
IV. Constitutional Limitations on a States' Power to Tax
Property Outside Its Borders
A. Due Process
A state's power constitutionally to impose a tax on the transfer,
at death, of personalty or realty physically located within the state is
undisputed. Similarly unquestioned is a state's power to tax the
portion of a domiciliary's estate consisting of intangible personal
property located outside the state.59 But limitations upon a state's
power to consider out-of-state real and tangible personal property in
the calculation of a death tax are not as certain. Courts clearly have
forbidden a direct tax on such property, enunciating that the state
has no jurisdiction over the property and, therefore, has no power to
impose a tax.60 Nevertheless, courts have not limited the extent of a
state's power to tax out-of-state tangible property to a total exclusion
State Government Commission, 1963 Report, stating that "in the case of a resident of Penn-
sylvania who is also subjected to a death tax such as that imposed by Florida, [the estate tax] is
imposed without credit for any of the tax paid to Florida, whose tax is one in the amount of the
Federal credit."
57. Inheritance taxes.- Instructions to Registers of Wills, 9 Pa. Fiduc. 586, 592-93 (1959).
Computation of the tax remains essentially the same under the 1982 Act.
58. Eg., see Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1897).
59. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
60. Indeed we know of no case where a legislature has assumed to impose a upon
land within the jurisdiction of another state, much less where such action has been
defended by any court. It is said by this court ... that no adjudication should be
necessary to establish so obvious a proposition as that property lying beyond the
jurisdiction of a state is not a subject upon which her taxing power can be legiti-
mately exercised.
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 204 (1905).
of such property from the computation of a death tax.6 ' The follow-
ing is a brief overview of the evolution of state power to tax property
with an extra-territorial situs.
1. State's Power to Tax Intangibles. -The power of a domicili-
ary state to impose a death tax on the transfer of a decedent's in-
tangibles is made possible by the fiction of mobilia sequuntur
personam. 62 Under this doctrine, intangible property follows "the
law of the person," (the domiciliary state), regardless of the prop-
erty's physical situs. Not even evidence of a writing indicating the
property's location can restrict a state's power to tax under this doc-
trine.63 Likewise, imposition of a tax by another jurisdiction on the
identical intangibles does not defeat the domiciliary state's power to
tax those intangibles.64 Although double taxation of intangibles is
constitutionally permissible, states have been reluctant to subject a
decedent's estate to this type of burden. Many states further this pol-
icy by enacting statutes that exempt from death taxes a nonresident's
intangibles found within their jurisdiction whenever the domiciliary
state offers the same exemption.65 Pennsylvania does not require
even this reciprocity, exempting intangibles of any nonresident from
the state's death tax.66
Because a state can give extra-territorial effect to its death tax
statute when taxing intangibles, a pick-up tax computation that in-
cludes the value of out-of-state intangible property is not constitu-
tionally infirm. What does merit constitutional scrutiny, however, is
an estate or inheritance tax computation that includes the value of
tangible property with an out-of-state situs.
2. State's Power to Tax Tangibles. -On three occasions, the
United States Supreme Court has attempted to define the jurisdic-
tional limitations of state death taxes that incorporate the value of
61. See infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
62. "The maxim 'mobilia sequuntur personam' means only that it is the identity or asso-
ciation of intangibles with the person of their owner at his domicile which gives jurisdiction to
tax." Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 367 (19390.
63. See Bittker, The Taxation ofOut ofState Tangible Property, 56 YALE L.J. 640 (1947).
64. See, e.g., State Tax Comm'r v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1941).
65. See 5 INHER. EST. & GiFT TAX REP. (CCH) $ 70,111-633. At one time, the domicile
state of a decedent-owner of intangible property had exclusive power to levy a death tax on
intangible property, regardless of situs. This power derived from the concept that transmission
of intangible personal property from decedent to donees could occur only as a single act, and
that act could occur only in one state. Thus, under the principle of mobilia sequuntur per-
sonam, jurisdiction to tax the event could reside only in the owner's state of domicile.
States now base development of a second tax situs for intangibles on a benefit and protec-
tion theory. If the nondomicile state of the decedent-owner can show that its laws have con-
ferred some benefit or protection to the intangibles, that state may tax the property upon its
transfer at the owner's death.
66. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2485-306 (Purdon 1964).
out-of-state tangible property in their calculations.67 The Court uti-
lized the fourteenth amendment due process clause to strike portions
of two taxes.68  Recently the California Supreme Court, applying
federal constitutional principles, invalidated a regulation that im-
properly included the value of out-of-state tangible property in the
computation of that state's pick-up tax.69 These cases afford a basis
for analysis of the Pennsylvania estate tax in light of due process
restrictions.
B. Case Law
1. The Maxwell, Frick and Treichler Trilogy. -In Maxwell v.
Bugbee,7 o the executors of two estates challenged the validity of New
Jersey's inheritance tax, contending that the statute's extra-territorial
effect deprived decedents, estates of property without due process of
law.7' The statute in question imposed the state's graduated inheri-
tance tax on in-state property of the estates of nonresident dece-
dents.72 Unlike many death tax statutes, the situs of the property
was paramount in determining tax liability; the decedent-owner's
domicile did not affect imposition of the tax. Thus, a taxpayer
would calculate the applicable tax rate by determining the value of
the decedent's estate, wherever situated. For tax rate purposes, the
statute considered all a decedent's property to have a tax situs in
New Jersey. Once the rate was determined, the state would levy a
tax only on that property having an actual situs within the state.73
Consequently, New Jersey taxed all in-state property according to
the estate's maximum tax bracket as calculated under the graduated
inheritance tax.74
67. Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251 (1949); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 263 U.S. 473
(1925); Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525 (1919). See infra notes 70-106 and accompanying
text.
68. See infra notes 80-106 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
70. 250 U.S. 525 (1919).
71. Maxwell involved two cases that had been consolidated for appeal. Maxwell was
executor of the estate of James McDonald, a resident of the District of Columbia. McDonald's
entire estate, valued at $3,969,322, included real estate in Idaho and stock in the Standard Oil
Company, a New Jersey corporation, valued at $1,114,965.
The estate of James Hill, a resident of Minnesota, had a value of $52,814,762. The estate
consisted of real estate in Minnesota and New York, and stock valued at $2,317,564 in a New
Jersey corporation. The tax assessed against McDonald's estate equalled $29,071; the Hill
estate equalled $67,018.
72. Act of April 9, 1914, P.L. 1914. New Jersey's inheritance tax statute stated as follows:
A tax shall be assessed on the transfer of property made subject to tax as aforesaid, in
this state of a nonresident decedent if all or any part of the estate of such decedent,
wherever situated, shall pass to persons or corporations taxable under this act, which
tax shall bear the same ratio to the entire tax which the said estate would have been
subject to under this act if such nonresident decedent had been a resident of this state,
and all his property, real and personal, had been located within this state bears to the
entire estate wherever situated . ...
73. See supra note 72.
74. See infra note 75.
The executors argued that this computation effectively taxed
property beyond the state's jurisdiction. By including the value of
real and tangible personal property located in other states in the
computation of the inheritance tax, New Jersey impermissibly ex-
ceeded the scope of its jurisdictional power. A bare majority of the
Supreme Court found this argument unpersuasive.75 The majority
agreed that a direct tax on such property would be patently unconsti-
tutional. The Court determined, however, that New Jersey's tax was
not actually a property tax but, rather a tax on the privilege of pass-
ing property at the owner's death. Due process limitations that the
state could not exceed still existed, but here the state had remained
within the confines of its jurisdictional power.76 Only the tax rate
reflected the value of the out-of-state property. Disregarding that
rate, the statute measured the applicable tax by the value of property
located solely within the state and, therefore, did not transgress due
process limitations.77 Thus, the Court concluded that the rate of tax-
ation imposed on the privilege of passing property, if not confisca-
tory, was wholly a matter of state policy.
Justice Holmes' dissent expressed strong disapproval of the ma-
jority's reasoning. Holmes believed that the majority had acquiesced
to accept form over substance,78 in essence authorizing a state's use
of an indirect "privilege" tax to levy on property that could not be
reached directly with a property tax. Holmes argued that if a state
lacked jurisdiction to tax property directly, the state could not ac-
75. The decision was 5-4. Perhaps the majority's conclusion rested upon the nature of
state progressive inheritance taxes. Arguably, the New Jersey statute under consideration in
Maxwell was the fairest mathod of taxing estates composed of multistate property.
The following hypothetical illustrates the application, of New Jersey's law. Assume two
estates each are valued at $100,000. Estate A, located entirely within New Jersey, is taxed at a
6% rate. Estate B has property equally divided between New Jersey and another state having a
progressive tax structure. Each state imposes a 4% tax rate on a $50,000 estate. Estate B would
have a tax liability to each state in the amount of $2000, for an aggregate liability of $4000.
Estate A would pay $6000. The New Jersey Legislature enacted the progressive inheritance
tax to rectify this disparity. If both states in the preceding hypothetical had a statute like New
Jersey's, each would assess a tax in the amount of $3000 (6% of $50,000) for a total of $6000.
Thus a property owner with a single situs of property receives no penalty, and a multistate
property owner receives no advantage.
76. It is only in instances where the state exceeds its authority in imposing a tax
upon a subject-matter within its jurisdiction in such a way as to really amount to
taxing that which is beyond its authority, that such exercise of power by the state is
held void. In cases of that character the attempted taxation must fail.
Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525, 540 (1919).
77. The executors in Maxwell offered two further challenges to New Jersey's tax, both of
which the court rejected. The executors contended that the act violated the privileges and
immunities clause of paragraph 1, § 2, Art. IV of the United States Constitution. The Court
denied this claim on the narrow ground that the statute spoke in terms of residency, not citi-
zenship. The executors then alleged an equal protection violation: In response, the Court
found the tax not "so wholly arbitrary and unreasonable as to be beyond the legitimate author-
ity of the state." Id. at 542.
78. "It seems to me that when property outside the state is taken into account for the
purpose of increasing the tax upon property within it, the property outside is taxed in effect, no
matter what form of words may be used." Id. at 544 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
complish a similar objective by subterfuge.79 Nevertheless, Maxwell
stands for the proposition that a state may use the value of out-of-
state, tangible personal property and realty to determine the rate of a
death tax if that rate subsequently applies only to the portion of the
decedent's estate which lies within the taxing state.
Six years later, in Frick v. Pennsylvania, 80 the Supreme Court
invalidated a section of Pennsylvania's inheritance tax on due pro-
cess grounds. Pennsylvania levied a tax upon a resident decedent's
transfer bequest or intestate succession to tangible and intangible
personal property wherever situated. 8' The legislature made no at-
tempt to limit this tax to in-state property while varying the rate, as
had the system approved in Maxwell Rather, Pennsylvania's tax
applied a flat rate to the aggregate value of a decedent's estate with-
out distinguishing in-state from out-of-state tangible personal
property.82
Henry Frick died testate while domiciled in Pennsylvania. His
vast estate consisted of both real and personal property located in
Pennsylvania.83 In addition, he owned tangible personalty having
an actual situs in other states.84 The inheritance tax levied on his
estate included out-of-state property in the amount on which the flat
tax rate was applied.
Pennsylvania attempted to defend this tax by using the Maxwell
decision and by distinguishing the Court's pronouncements on direct
property taxes. Contending that this inheritance tax was not a prop-
erty tax, the state argued that the Court's decisions on jurisdictional
limitations imposed on the power of the states to levy property taxes
were not controlling. Furthermore, it was asserted, Pennsylvania
merely was acting as New Jersey had in considering out-of-state
property when calculating an inheritance tax. Pennsylvania argued
further that, as domiciliary state, it could regulate, under escheat
law, the disposition of a resident decedent's property as it wished.
Pennsylvania also stressed that the tax did not apply to realty be-
yond state borders, but extended its extra-territorial effect only to
personal property.
The Court rejected these arguments and held that Penn-
79. "Many things that a legislature may do if it does them with no ulterior purpose, it
cannot do as a means to reach what is beyond its constitutional power." Id at 542 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
80. 263 U.S. 472 (1925), rev'g 277 Pa. 242 (1923).
81. Act of June 20, 1919, P.L. 521, art. I, § I (forerunner of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72,
§ 2485-101 (Purdon 1964)).
82. Pennsylvania's statute taxed 2% of the clear value of property transferred to relatives
of the decedent and 5% on property transferred to others.
83. Frick's federal estate tax alone was $6,338,898.
84. Frick owned tangible personalty in New York valued at $13,132,391. This property
consisted of various art treasures known as the "Frick Collection." The estate also included
tangible personalty in Massachusetts valued at over $77,000.
sylvania's attempt to tax tangible personal property with an actual
situs in other states contravened the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.85 Dismissing the escheat law argument, the
Court noted that the only law under consideration was a tax law,
with its attendant due process restrictions.8 6 Furthermore, the Court
rejected the notion that a valid distinction existed between a direct
tax on out-of-state property and a tax on the transmission of out-of-
state property. A distinction could not be drawn because the statute
used, in part, the value of out-of-state property to measure the tax. 7
Acknowledging that Maxwell was "on the borderline," 8 the
Court carefully distinguished the two cases. Maxwell had involved a
tax imposed on property solely within the state's jurisdiction. That
tax law used the value of out-of-state property merely to determine
the tax rate on in-state property. In the provision under considera-
tion in Frick, Pennsylvania used the value of out-of-state, tangible
personal property as the measure of the tax, applying the flat rate to
that figure. Practically, Pennsylvania had levied a tax on transmis-
sion of property over which it had no jurisdiction. This, according to
the Court, was a violation of due process. The crucial distinction
between the Pennsylvania and New Jersey taxes was the base to
which the tax applied. The measure of the tax could not include the
value of out-of-state tangible property. Instead, only the tax rate
could vary by considering out-of-state tangible property, and this
property could be considered only then when in-state property was
the measure of the tax,
Treichler v. Wisconsin, 9 (TreichlerI) is the only case in which
the Supreme Court addressed, albeit indirectly, the due process limi-
tations of a tax based upon the federal credit for state death taxes. In
Treichler I, the decedent, a resident of Wisconsin, left an estate con-
sisting of tangible property. Eighty-seven percent of this property
85. The Court cited a string of cases to support the following propositions:
[F]irst, that the exaction by a state of a tax which it is without power to impose is a
taking of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; secondly, that while a state may so shape its tax as to reach every object which
is under its jurisdiction it cannot give them any extraterritorial operation; and thirdly,
that as respects tangible personal property having an actual situs in a particular state,
the power to subject it to state taxation rests exclusively in that state, regardless of the
domicile of the owner.
Frick v. Pennsylvania, 263 U.S. 473, 488-89 (1923).
86. The court noted that to impose either an escheat law or tax law without jurisdiction
would constitute extortion and would contravene due process of law. Id at 492.
87. Without question each State had power to tax the transfer of so much of the
estate as was under its jurisdiction, and also had some discretion in respect to the
rate; but none could use that power and discretion in accomplishing an unconstitu-
tional end, such as indirectly taxing the transfer of the part of the estate which was
under the exclusive jurisdiction of others.
Id. at 495; accord Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
88. Frick, 262 U.S. at 495.
89. 338 U.S. 251 (1949), rev'g In re Miller's Estate, 254 Wis. 24, 35 N.W.2d 404 (1948).
was situated within the state;90 the remaining property was distrib-
uted between Florida and Illinois. 91 Wisconsin had a triad of death
taxes: a normal inheritance tax,92 an estate tax to absorb the federal
credit;93 and an emergency tax94 amounting to an additional levy of
thirty percent of the other two taxes. The estate's executor instituted
a challenge to the emergency tax citing due process violations.
When Wisconsin's Supreme Court upheld the tax assessor's compu-
tation,95 the executor appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The state's assessor computed the estate tax, on which the addi-
tional thirty percent emergency tax was levied, by deducting all state
death taxes from the entire allowable federal credit. 96 Wisconsin im-
posed the remainder as an estate tax. The executor argued that Wis-
consin's statute assessed a tax on tangible personal property outside
the state. Consequently, the tax directly violated the Frick principle.
By allocating the entire federal credit to Wisconsin, the state had
taxed out-of-state property. Moreover, the emergency tax, by utiliz-
ing the estate tax as its base, incorporated the due process violation
of the underlying estate tax.97 The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed
that use of the entire credit might reach an unconstitutional result.98
Nevertheless, the court held, on the facts presented, that no basis
existed for the constitutional challenge. This conclusion followed
from the court's holding that because eighty-seven percent of the es-
tate consisted of property within the state, Wisconsin had not ex-
ceeded its jurisdiction by taking the entire federal credit since that
90. Fred Miller, a resident of Wisconsin, died testate in 1943. At death, his gross estate
was valued at $7,849,715. His property located in Wisconsin was valued at $6,869,779. Id. at
252.
91. Treichler's Florida and Illinois property consisted of realty and tangible personalty
valued at $979,936. Id
92. WIs. STAT. §§ 72.01-72.24 (1947).
93. Id § 72.50. This statute provided, in part, that
[tihe amount of said tax shall be equal to the extent, if any, of the excess of the credit
of not exceeding eighty percent, allowable under said United States revenue act, over
the aggregate amount of all estates, inheritance, transfer, legacy and succession taxes
paid to any state or territory or the District of Columbia, in respect to any property in
the estate of said decedent.
94. Id § 72.74.
95. The tax assessor computed the taxes owing on Trechler's estate as follows:
(1) Wisconsin Normal Inheritance Tax $220,682.12
(2) Wisconsin Estate Tax
Maximum Allowable Federal Credit $630,709.12
Less: (a) Wis. Normal Taxes $220,682.12
(b) Ill. Inherit. Tax 35,616.26
(c) Fla. Inhert. Tax 21,709.45
Total State Taxes $278,007.83
Difference $252,701.79
(3) Additional Emergency Tax $172,015.20
96. Wisconsin's estate tax is best explained by the following formula:
(Entire federal credit) - (All state death taxes paid) = Estate tax.
97. The emergency tax can be reduced to the following formula: (Normal Inheritance
Tax + Estate Tax) x 30% = Emergency Tax.
98. In re Miller's Estate, 254 Wis. 24, 35 N.W.2d 404 (1948).
credit consisted of only eighty percent of the federal tax.9 9
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed."° The Court deter-
mined that the emergency tax, as computed, was "rated and mea-
sured" by the entire estate, regardless of the situs of the estate's
tangible property.' 0 ' The federal credit, based on the gross estate,
necessarily included out-of-state property. Moreover, the Court re-
jected the contention that eighty-seven percent of the property within
Wisconsin entitled that state to claim the benefit of the entire credit.
In this case, the percentage of property within Wisconsin exceeded
the percentage of the federal estate tax granted as a credit. Never-
theless, the Court deemed this occurrence to be "simply a fortu-
ity."'0 2 The legislature had made no effort to apportion the credit
according to the value of property with the state's borders. Thus, the
emergency tax ran afoul of the due process limitations pronounced
in Frick. The Court held that the emergency tax, as applied to the
estate tax computation, was unconstitutional.
0 3
On remand," the Wisconsin Supreme Court apportioned the
federal credit on the basis of the percentage of estate property lo-
cated within Wisconsin. 105 In a terse per curiam decision (Treichler
II) "0 the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of this new
computation.
The Treichler decisions dictate that a state tax based on the fed-
eral credit cannot capture the entire credit either as the base or as the
measure of the tax. An exception applies when the entire real and
tangible personal property of the estate lies within the state's juris-
diction. When an estate consists of multistate real and tangible per-
sonal property, however, the state receives only that portion of the
credit bearing some relationship to the value of in-state property.
Mere reduction of the credit by out-of-state death taxes does not ful-
fill this requirement. As stated in Treichler I, such an allowance has
"no necessary relation to the proportion of property outside"'0 7 the
99. Id
100. Treichler v. Wisconsin, 638 U.S. 251 (1949).
101. Id. at 254. The Treichler court may have used the phrase "rated and measured"
inadvertently. The Court in Maxwell had permitted a tax to be rated on out-of-state tangible
property. Thus, the Court probably considered the term "measured" to be the key word in
invalidation of a tax with extraterritorial effect.
102. Id. at 255.
103. "A different question might be presented, however, if the statute in question author-
ized computation to begin with 87.52% rather than all of the 80% federal credit. We intend to
intimate no opinion as to that situation." Id. at 255 n.3.
104. In re Miller's Bstate, 257 Wis. 439, 43 N.W.2d 428 (1950), aff'dper curiam sub nom.
Treichler v. Wisconsin, 340 U.S. 868 (1950).
105. The following formula expresses the net effect of computation of the emergency tax:
Taxable Wisconsin Property X Federal Credit for State Death Taxes x 30%
Federal Gross Estate
106. Treichler v. Wisconsin, 340 U.S. 868 (1950).
107. Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251, 255 (1949).
state. Because a state can tax at almost any rate desired, subtraction
of these taxes from the credit would not necessarily reflect the value
of out-of-state property. '0 8 Thus, the proportionate share of federal
credit that a state can receive must be based on the ratio of in-state to
out-of-state property held by the estate, rather than on a figure de-
rived by reducing the credit by out-of-state death taxes.1° In Frick
and Maxwell parlance, a state that appropriates the entire federal
credit when an estate consists of multistate property takes as a
"measure" of its tax a sum based on property beyond its jurisdiction.
If the state subsequently multiplies this sum by the percentage that
the in-state property bears to the gross estate, however, the tax be-
comes "rated" by out-of-state property, a result permissible under
Maxwell and Treichler H. to
2. State Interpretation.: Estate of Fasken. -In 1977, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court applied the lessons of Maxwell, Frick and
Treichler I & I in Estate of Fasken. 11 California imposed its pick-
up tax on decedent's estates when the state's inheritance tax did not
reach the maximum allowable federal credit.I 2 A provision in the
tax statute provided that only a portion of the credit would be taken
when an estate consisted of both in-state and out-of-state prop-
erty." 3 A regulation defined computation of the tax as the federal
credit minus all death taxes assessed, multiplied by the percentage of
the estate consisting of California property.t 4 The executor of the
Fasken estate claimed that this method of computation was uncon-
108. Compare Decedents' Estates E and F in the Appendix. Both estates have identical
in-state and out-of-state property holdings. The sole distinguishing characteristic is that each
estate has a different state situs for its out-of-state property. Under Pennsylvania's estate tax
statute, the tax liabilities of the estates vary significantly. As in Treichler 1, this difference is
attributable to the failure of the computation (subtracting out-of-state death taxes from the
federal credit) to reflect the value of out-of-state property.
109. See supra note 105.
110. See Rev. Rul. 56-230, 1 C.B. 660, 661. "[T]he allowance of credit ... is limited in
the instant case and will be limited in all other similar cases to the proportion of the full
Federal credit allowable to the estate which is attributable to that part of the gross estate
situated in (the state where the tangibles have their situs)." But cf Simco v. Shirk, 146 Tex.
259, 206 S.W.2d 221 (1947). (Eighty percent federal credit need not be allocated when an
estate consists of multistate property.)
111. 19 Cal. 3d 412, 563 P.2d 832, 128 Cal. Rptr. 276, cert. denied sub. nom. Cory v. Fas-
ken, 434 U.S. 877 (1977).
112. CAL. REVENUE & TAXATION CODE §§ 12441-2 (West 1970). Section 13441 reads as
follows:
In the event that a Federal estate tax is payable to the United States in a case where
the inheritance tax payable to this State is less than the maximum State tax credit
allowed by the Federalestate tax law, a tax equal to the difference between the maxi-
mum credit and the inheritance tax payable is hereby imposed.
113. The Fasken estate consisted of property valued at $11,384,060 in California and
$13,631,515 in Texas.
114. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, R 13411-2 (1970). This regulation, reduced to a formula,
was:CaioiaPoet(Entire Federal Credit - State Inheritance Taxes) × California Propt
Gross Estate
stitutional because it did not conform to the approved Treichler 11
formula.
The California Supreme Court agreed and held that the regula-
tion failed to pass constitutional muster."t 5 The court reasoned that
while the Treichler decisions did not require states to adopt a specific
method of apportioning the credit, they did set certain fundamental
guidelines. The Treichler HI computation applied without regard to
other states' taxes in determining the share of the credit which the
state could receive. In contrast, the California regulation used the
value of out-of-state property as the measure of the tax. By initially
subtracting total death taxes imposed by all states and then allocat-
ing a portion of the remainder to California, the state still relied im-
permissibly on out-of-state property as the base upon which the
estate tax was computed.
To illustrate the infirmity of this calculation, assume that an-
other state does not tax out-of-state, tangible property. 6 California
then would begin computation by claiming the entire federal credit.
As previously related, Congress based this credit on the gross estate.
Consequently, California, in effect, took as the base of the state's tax
a sum measured by the value of out-of-state as well as in-state prop-
erty." 7 Although the next calculation used only a portion of the
credit as determined by the percentage of the estate's in-state prop-
erty. This calculation, however, merely varied the amount of tax
that already had established as its base the federal credit measured
by multistate property."t8 The court thus struck the regulation as
violative of the due process clause. Although the regulation was in-
validated, the court upheld the statute upon which it was based, find-
ing that law susceptible to an interpretation consistent with Treichler
i. ii9
C The Pennsylvania Estate Tax.: The Due Process Challenge
In light of the preceding case law, the Pennsylvania estate tax
cannot easily be given an interpretation consistent with due process.
If the emergency tax- in Treichler I fell solely because the underlying
estate tax was unconstitutional, then the Pennsylvania estate tax, suf-
115. Estate of Fasken, 19 Cal. 3d 412, 563 P.2d 832, 138 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1977); see also
Note, The Proper Apportionment o/Pick-Up Taxes, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 381 (1978).
116. See supra note 22.
117. The following is an example of the results of California's basing system. If the fed-
eral credit was $100,000 and the jurisdiction in which the tangible property was situate did not
impose a death tax, California would begin computation by taking the full $100,000.
118. Thus, California's share of the credit was dependent on the tax structure of other
states. See supra note 108.
119. See supra note 112. (The savings to the Fasken estate was $463,858 under the
Treichler HI formula.)
fering from the same infirmity, also must fail to pass constitutional
scrutiny.
Calculation of the Pennsylvania tax begins with the maximum
allowed federal credit; 20 this amount becomes the measure of the
tax. Even when an estate has property valued at only one dollar in
Pennsylvania and one million dollars outside Pennsylvania, the
Commonwealth takes the entire credit. There is no apportion-
ment.' 2' As previously discussed, subsequent reduction of the credit
by all death taxes paid is not a constitutionally valid means of allo-
cating the amount of credit to which a state is entitled. 122 Further-
more, when the calculation excludes the death tax of another state
because that tax is based on the federal credit, not even a pretense
that Pennsylvania is taking only its proportionate share exists.
123
Moreover, the statute cannot be interpreted to conform with the
Treichler II formula. First, the statute expressly delineates the
method of tax calculation. Thus, no logical or consistent construc-
tion of the statute can result in apportionment of the credit.1 24 Addi-
tionally, the estate tax on nonresidents of the United States, drafted
and enacted with the comparable tax on residents, specifically re-
quires apportionment of the credit. t25 Curiously this tax strictly con-
forms to Treichler .126 Contemporaneous enactment of these
statutes is clear evidence of a legislative intent not to apportion the
credit in determining the estate tax on residents. t27 Consequently,
the only possible interpretation of the Pennsylvania estate tax mani-
festly violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
V. The Pennsylvania Constitution's Uniformity Requirement
A. Scope of the Uniformity Provision
The Pennsylvania Constitution requires that "[a]ll taxes shall be
120. See supra note 1.
121. See supra note 108 and see Decedent's Estates E and F in Appendix.
122. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
123. Compare Decedent's Estates B and E in Appendix. Both have identical Penn-
sylvania death tax liabilities although only one-half of Estate E is located in Pennsylvania.
This situation arises whenever a foreign jurisdiction bases its death tax on the federal credit.
124. Courts must resolve all reasonable doubt in the construction of a tax statute in favor
of the taxpayer. I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1928(b)(3) (Purdon 1977).
125. See supra note 55.
126. The 1963 Report of the Joint State Government Commission cited Treichler I with
approval for apportionment of the federal credit in § 2485-431 (now 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1717(b)), yet conspicuously does not include the case in the discussion of § 2485-421 (now 72
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1717(a)). See supra note 56.
127. Although no canon of construction is directly on point, two tax statutes on the same
subject matter, with clearly different methods of computing the tax, logically should be given
different interpretations. "Experience indicates that a legislature does not deliberately enact
inconsistent provisions when it is cognizant of them both, without expressly recognizing the
inconsistency." C. SANDS, 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.01, at 288 (3d
ed. 1972).
uniform, upon the same class of subjects .. ."128 This provision
has remained essentially unaltered since its adoption in the Penn-
sylvania Constitution of 1873.129 The continuing purpose of this
provision is to secure an equality of tax burdens among individuals
similarly situated. 3 ' Although the legislature has broad discretion
in enacting and imposing classifications for tax purposes, Penn-
sylvania courts have invalidated irrational classifications since the
provision's inception. 13' These courts have given further effect to the
provision by interpreting uniformity to preclude imposition of a
graduated or progressive tax scheme 32 and exemptions based solely
on quantity (dollar amounts).
33
The uniformity provision does not apply only to property taxes.
All species of tax are subject to its prohibitions. 134 Income, 135 occu-
pational privilege, 136 mercantile, 131 sales,131 inheritance, 139 as wen as
property taxes'0 must meet the constraints of uniformity. The
Pennsylvania estate tax, an excise tax on the privilege of passing
property upon the owner's death, 141 clearly is within the scope of this
constitutional mandate and, therefore, necessarily is subject to its
application.
A taxing statute or ordinance challenged as violative of the uni-
128. Article VIII, § 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states as follows: "All taxes shall
be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levy-
ing the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws." Section 2 provides certain
exemptions and special provisions, none of which are applicable to this comment. PA. CONST.
art. VIII, §§ 1-2.
129. Prior to adoption of the uniformity provision, no express constitutional provision
restricted Pennsylvania's power to implement a tax. Only the Bill of Rights implicitly limited
the taxing power by forbidding "all unjust, unreasonable, and palpably unequal exactions
under any name or pretext." Hammet v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 146 (1869).
130. See e.g., American Stores Co. v. Boardman, 336 Pa. 3.6, 6 A.2d 174 (1939): The
electorate rejected legislative proposals to amend the uniformity clause in 1913 and 1928. Sec-
tion 7(b) of the May, 1976 referendum submitted to the people of Pennsylvania concerning
whether a constitutional convention should be called, specifically provided: "The convention
shall not consider or include in its recommendations any proposal which clearly permits or
prohibits the imposition of a graduated income tax . nor shall that part of Article IX,
Section 1 providing that: 'All taxes shall be uniform. .. ' be modified, altered, or changed in
any respect whatsoever... " Act of March 16, 1967, P.L. 2, § 7.
131. See Cope's Estate, 191 Pa. 1, 43 A. 79 (1899).
132. Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 180, 181 A. 598 (1925).
133. See Amidon v. Kane, 444 Pa. 38, 279 A.2d 53 (1971); Saulsbury v. Bethlehem Steel
Co., 413 Pa. 316, 196 A.2d 664 (1964).
134. See Saulsbury v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 413 Pa. 316, 196 A.2d 664 (1964); Common-
wealth rel. Dept. of Justice v. A. Overhold & Co., 331 Pa. 182, 200 A. 849 (1938); Cope's
Estate, 191 Pa. 1, 43 A. 79 (1899); Banger's Appeal, 109 Pa. 79 (1885).
135. Amidon v. Kane, 444 Pa. 38, 279 A.2d 53 (1971); Kelley v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 180, 181
A. 598 (1935).
136. Saulsbury v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 413 Pa. 316, 196 A.2d 664 (1964).
137. Allentown School Dist. Mercantile Tax Case, 370 Pa. 161, 87 A.2d 480 (1952).
138. Commonwealth v. Lafferty, 426 Pa. 541, 233 A.2d 256 (1967).
139. Cope's Estate, 191 Pa. 1, 43 A. 79 (1899).
140. Appeal of Biddle, 390 Pa. 460, 135 A.2d 915 (1957).
141. See In re Knowles' Estate, 295 Pa. 571, 145 A. 797 (1929).
formity provision mandates a two-tier analysis.'42 The first level of
scrutiny requires that classifications bear a reasonable or rational re-
lationship to a legitimate governmental objective.'4 3 In this regard,
the uniformity provision is similar to the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. The Penn-
sylvania uniformity provision and the federal equal protection
clause standpari materia. '44 The second level of scrutiny involves an
examination of the taxing scheme's effect within the designated class.
Thus, a facially valid classification passing the first level of scrutiny,
is not necessarily constitutional. For example, creation of certain
subclasses within the designated classification by means of a progres-
sive tax is patently unconstitutional.'45 Therefore, when analyzing a
Pennsylvania tax law, courts must answer two questions affirma-
tively before declaring the tax constitutional: (1) are the classifica-
tions reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose; and
(2) does the tax impose essentially equal burdens on those within the
class?
Taxpayers seeking to institute a uniformity challenge to a Penn-
sylvania tax law face a heavy burden."' 6 First, the courts require
unequivocal proof that the law violates uniformity. 47 Second, the
courts always will seek other grounds on which to decide the issue
before addressing the merits of a constitutional challenge.' 48 Third,
the courts will attempt to uphold the statute by interpreting it, if at
all possible, in a constitutionally permissible manner.' 49 Thus, the
court will excise that section of the law which is infirm if the remain-
der of the act can remain validly intact. 5 °
Nevertheless, a taxpayer does have some judicially created
assistance in attacking the constitutional validity of a tax law.
Courts will not consider the exigent circumstances that may have
142. See, e.g., Danyluk v. Johnstown, 406 Pa. 427, 178 A.2d 609 (1962).
143. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rohm & Haas Co., 28 Pa. Commw. 430, 368 A.2d 909
(1977).
144. Id; Appeal of Pa. Co., 40 Pa. D. & C. 489 (C.P. Phila. 1941).
145. American Stores Co. v. Boardman, 236 Pa. 36, 6 A.2d 174 (1939); Kelley v. Kalodner,
320 Pa. 180, 181 A. 598 (1935). A dated, but still accurate, example of the unconstitutionality
of creating subclasses is as follows:
The power of the state is conceded to select its subjects of taxation. It may tax horses
or it may omit to tax them. But this tax, upon whatever laid, must be uniform. Thus
it must be laid upon all taxpayers alike. It cannot tax A on his mortgages or his
horses, and exempt B from a like tax.
Fox's Appeal, 112 Pa. 337, 353, 4 A. 149, 154 (1886).
146. E.g., Amidon v. Kane, 444 Pa. 38, 279 A.2d 53 (1971); Commonwealth v. Life Assur.
Co. of Pa., 419 Pa. 370, 214 A.2d 209 (1965).
147. Accord Commonwealth v. Life Assur. Co. of Pa., 419 Pa. 370, 214 A.2d 209 (1965);
Allentown School Dist. Mercantile Tax Case, 370 Pa. 161, 87 A.2d 480 (1952).
148. See, e.g., In re Knowles' Estate, 295 Pa. 571, 145 A. 797 (1929).
149. Commonwealth v. Staley, 476 Pa. 171, 381 A.2d 1280 (1978).
150. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2485-105 (Purdon 1964) is the severability clause for the
Inheritance Tax Act of 1961.
necessitated the imposition of the tax.' 5 ' Similarly, they will disre-
gard both the amount of revenue generated for the state and the al-
leged merit of the tax.'5 2 Moreover, the apparent fairness of the tax
will not rescue a statute that contravenes the uniformity provision.'
53
The following cases illustrate court application of the uniformity
provision to invalidate Pennsylvania tax laws.
B. Uniformity Restrictions: Case Law
In 1935, the Pennsylvania General Assembly instituted an an-
nual tax to be levied upon the net income of Pennsylvania resi-
dents. 54 Nonresidents were subject to a similar tax based upon
income raised by property holdings, the operation of a business, or
employment within the state. 55 The act also contained various ex-
emptions for the purpose of calculating a taxpayer's gross income
15 6
and permitted numerous deductions in the determination of net in-
come."'57 Finally, the taxpayer computed the amount of tax owed by
applying his income to a graduated schedule.' 58 Soon after its enact-
ment, the tax was challenged as violative of the state constitution's
uniformity provision in Kelley v. Kalodner. '59
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that two aspects of the
tax violated the uniformity provision and thus declared the act un-
constitutional. The exemptions, although probably a product of leg-
islative judgment concerning who best could bear the tax liability,
resulted in a nonuniform allocation of the tax burden. The tax
schedule also was infirm because the provision subjected the same
kind of property (income), held by different taxpayers, to varying tax
rates. Consequently, the tax could pass neither level of scrutiny
under the uniformity analysis. The exemptions, allowing levy of the
tax on some taxpayers but not on others, created impermissible clas-
sifications. Tax brackets created a series of subclassifications within
the class of taxpayers delineated by the statute (those with net in-
come). Both the exemptions and the tax brackets caused a widely
disparate tax liability among individuals similarly situated.' 60 As a
151. Accord Pittsburgh Rys. Co. v. Port of Allegheny County Auth., 415 Pa. 177, 202 A.2d
816 (1964); Cali. v. Philadelphia, 406 Pa. 290, 177 A.2d 824 (1962).
152. Accord Blauner's Inc. v. Philadelphia, 330 Pa. 342, 187 A. 889 (1938).
153. Amidon v. Kane, 444 Pa. 38, 279 A.2d 53 (1971). "It has become a mere platitude to
state, what has so often been proclaimed, that Courts are concerned, not with the wisdom of
legislation, but with the right of the legislative body to enact it-not with policy but with
power." National Biscuit Co. v. Philadelphia, 374 Pa. 604, 608, 98 A.2d 182, 184 (1953).
154. Act of July 12, 1935, P.L. 970.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id Deductions allowed under the 1935 income tax included amounts for living ex-
penses and for dependents under eighteen.
158. The 1935 graduated tax rate began at 2% and escalated sharply as income increased.
159. 320 Pa. 180, 181 A. 568 (1935).
160. Id
result, the court invalidated the 1935 act.
Similarly, Saulsbury v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 161 illustrates the ap-
plication of the uniformity provision to a tax law that grants exemp-
tions. In 1964, the city of Johnstown enacted an occupational
privilege tax on gross earnings of those employed within the city.'
62
The act excused wage earners whose income was less than six hun-
dred dollars from payment of the tax. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court ruled that this tax transgressed the boundaries erected by prior
interpretations of the uniformity provision. 63 Imposition of the tax
as an excise on the privilege of working in Johnstown did not insu-
late the tax from uniformity restrictions. Neither party raised an ob-
jection to the classification of those engaged in an occupation as the
subject of the tax. The court concluded, however, that within the
class thus defined, those who shared the same privilege--employ-
ment-must share the tax burden equally. Consequently, the six
hundred dollar floor created an impermissible subclass. Again, the
court refused to consider the legislative motive for excusing some
wage earners from the tax."M The court contended that the uniform-
ity provision's sanctions would not yield to social policy considera-
tions when imposition of a tax created unequal tax burdens.
Not until the Personal Income Tax Act of 1971165 did Penn-
sylvania again institute a statewide income tax. Taxpayers immedi-
ately challenged the tax as repugnant to the uniformity provision.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided the fate of this new tax in
Amidon v. Kane. 166
The Pennsylvania General Assembly chose to compute the new
tax as a flat three and one-half percent of the taxpayer's taxable in-
come as defined in the Federal Internal Revenue Code. 16 7 Taxable
income, as determined in the Code, consisted of gross income minus
myriad adjustments, deductions, and exemptions. 168 The Penn-
sylvania income tax was directly tied to the resultant figure on the
federal income tax return.
169
Nevertheless, the court declared that taxable income, as defined
in the Internal Revenue Code and borrowed by Pennsylvania, was
an "artificial construct."' 170 This "construct" had little relation to the
161. 413 Pa. 316, 196 A.2d 664 (1964).
162. Johnstown imposed an occupational privilege tax of $10 per year on those whose
earnings amounted to $600 or more per year. Id
163. "If a tax is levied on an occupational privilege, it must apply to all who share the
privilege." Id. at 319, 196 A.2d at 666.
164. Id. at 320, 196 A.2d at 667.
165. Article III of the Tax Reform Code of 197 1, adopted March 4, 1971, Act No. 2.
166. 444 Pa. 38, 279 A.2d 53 (1971).
167. I.R.C. §§ 102, 102, 106, 116 (1954).
168. I.R.C. §§ 141-217 (1954).
169. On the 1040 form in 1971, line 50 was identified as taxable income.
170. Amidon v. Kane, 444 Pa. 28, 42, 279 A.2d 53, 56 (1971).
equalization of the tax burden purportedly mandated by the Penn-
sylvania tax. The professed object of the act was to tax the privilege
of earning income "from any source whatsoever."'' By adopting
the federal scheme in the Commonwealth's tax structure, Penn-
sylvania indirectly incorporated those calculations that produced the
federal net income figure. The court noted that this figure bore little
resemblance to an individual's actual income. To illustrate the ineq-
uities of the tax, the court included a number of tables in its deci-
sion. "'72 These tables showed that taxpayers with identical incomes,
enjoying the same privilege, had disparate tax burdens.
7 3
Although the various deductions, exemptions, and credits pro-
vided by the act and the Code served some useful social policy, the
court nevertheless held that furtherance of policy was irrelevant to
constitutional adjudication.' 74 The tax was emphatically
nonuniform, imposing "different tax burdens upon persons enjoying
identical privileges.' 75 No two taxpayers paid the same dollar
amount in taxes, nor were they "required to pay the same effective
percentage rate of taxation upon their respective total incomes.""76
Judicial construction of the uniformity provision has never
mandated absolute mathematic precision in equalization of the tax
burden.77 The flat three and one-half percent tax under scrutiny in
Amidon would not appear to subject taxpayers earning identical in-
comes to an unequal tax liability. But the flat rate could not disguise
the underlying infirmity that the basis of the tax, net income, varied
widely with the ability of a taxpayer to claim one or more of the
available exemptions, deductions, or credits. Thus, Amidon ex-
tended the Kelley and Saulsbury rationales to prohibit imposition of
a constitutionally infirm tax computation through indirect means.
Labeling a tax as "flat," while incorporating calculations that render
it nonuniform in application, will not cure an otherwise unconstitu-
tional levy.
C. The Pennsylvania Estate Tax.: The Uniformity Challenge
Just as the Pennsylvania income tax of 1971 Was inextricably
interwoven with the federal income tax, the Pennsylvania estate tax
171. 1d. at 42, 279 A.2d at 55.
172. The tables included in the Amidon opinion illustrated the various deductions and
exemptions provided by the Pennsylvania and federal tax laws and their effect on taxpayers
similarly situated.
173. Because of various deductions and exemptions provided by the Pennsylvania tax, the
effective tax rate varied from 1.77% to 2.59% and from 2.04% to 3.01% for taxpayers with
similar incomes.
174. See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
175. Amidon v. Kane, 444 Pa. 33, 48, 279 A.2d 52, 62 (1971).
176. Id.
177. Eg., Columbia Gas Corp. v. Commonwealth, 468 Pa. 145, 360 A.2d 592 (1976).
shares a similar relationship with the federal estate tax.' 7 ' The
Pennsylvania estate tax has integrated provisions of a federal tax in
determining the computation base. Borrowing a federal tax base for
imposition of a Pennsylvania tax does not, in and of itself, render the
tax unconstitutional.'79 Nevertheless, when the computation of the
tax base involves impermissible exemptions and determination of
the base through application of a graduate schedule, the tax that in-
corporates that federal base is patently violative of the Pennsylvania
Constitution's uniformity provision. 8 '
For purposes of the estate tax, the 1971 act delineated two
classes of estates: those estates with a federal estate tax liability, and
those without. Because only estates exceeding a threshold amount
are subject to federal estate tax,' 8 ' lesser estates are not subject to
either the federal or Pennsylvania estate tax. This discrepancy alone
would not require invalidation of the Pennsylvania tax; an estate
may not have to pay either tax, however, as a direct result of quanti-
ty exemptions 182 and deductions.' 83 These exemptions and deduc-
tions have no rational relationship to the equalization of the tax
burden. Although permissible under federal law, this type of dis-
crimination violates the uniformity provision of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. 
8 14
Two examples illustrate the nonuniformity of Pennsylvania's es-
tate tax. Assume the existence of two estates valued at $4,000,000
and a third estate valued at $4,100,000.185 The effective rate of the
Pennsylvania estate tax on each may be zero percent, 1.01 percent
and 1.092 percent respectively. 86  Furthermore, the third estate
would compute tax on the additional $100,000 at an effective rate of
4.4 percent.8 7 The disparity between the effective rates of tax on
these estates is the result of deductions and the graduated federal
credit. Consequently, the statute artifically creates subclasses within
that class subject to the estate tax. This distinction directly conflicts
178. The Pennsylvania estate tax begins with the credit for state death taxes as reported on
I.R.S. Form 706.
179. See Commonwealth v. Warner Bros. Theatres Inc., 345 Pa. 270, 27 A.2d 62 (1942);
Turco Paint & Varnish Co. v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 421, 184 A. 37 (1936).
180. See supra notes 166-76 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 33.
182. See supra note 32 and Decedent's Estate A in Appendix.
183. See supra notes 33 and 39 and Decedent's Estate D in Appendix.
184. See supra notes 166-76 and accompanying text.
185. Decedents' Estates D, B and C respectively in the Appendix.
186. Id Because of an unlimited marital deduction provided in the federal estate tax,
Decedent's Estate D would have no federal estate liability and, therefore, no Pennsylvania
estate tax liability. Thus, the effective rate on passing the property is 0%. The effective tax rate
on Decedent's Estate B is 40,400/4,000,000 or 1.01%. The effective rate on Decedent's Estate C
is 44,800/4,100,000 or 1.092%.
187. See Appendix, Decedent's Estate C. On the $100,000 excess over $4,000,000, the
Pennsylvania estate tax increased by $4400. Thus, the effective rate of tax is 4400/100,000 or
4.4%.
with the mandate of uniformity. Again, consider three estates, each
with $4,000,000 of property located in Pennsylvania, and two with
property located out-of-state.18 8  If Pennsylvania imposed death
taxes only on the privilege of passing an estate in Pennsylvania, es-
tate tax liability of these estates would be comparable. Nevertheless,
depending upon the location of the out-of-state property, widely dis-
parate estate tax burdens may result on estates of identical value. 18 9
Thus the Commonwealth does not tax uniformly the privilege of
passing property located within its borders.
The nonuniform characteristics of the Pennsylvania's estate tax
clearly demonstrate that the tax: (1) results in a widely disparate
treatment of taxpayers similarly situated; (2) is a byproduct of incor-
poration of the federal estate tax credit computations; and (3) in-
cludes within these computations exemptions, deductions, and
progressive rate schedules of the federal credit that bear little rela-
tionship to the privilege being taxed. Consequently, the Common-
wealth's estate tax clearly violates the Pennsylvania Constitution's
uniformity provision as well as the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. The question remains, however, whether any
given estate can achieve standing to challenge the estate tax on these
merits.
VI. Standing to Assert the Constitutional Challenges
The most difficult hurdle a litigant must surmount in an action
to invalidate an estate tax is attainment of standing to assert the
claim. Generally, when a constitutional challenge arises, the tax-
payer-litigant must establish two prerequisites of standing before a
court will reach the merits. The party first must show that he has
sustained an actual or threatened injury which, in the case of a tax-
payer, usually is economic.' 9° This "injury in fact" requirement ne-
cessitates a showing of a causal connection between the injury and
the alleged violation of the constitutional right being asserted.' 9 '
Mere out-of-pocket loss is insufficient unless the litigant can trace the
origin of that loss to the challenged unconstitutional enactment. The
taxpayer then must prove that the interest sought to be protected is
arguably within the zone of interests protected by the constitutional
guarantee in question.' 92
188. Decedents' Estates B, G and H in Appendix.
189. Decedent's Estate B has a Pennsylvania estate tax liability of $40,400, Decedent's
Estate G has a liability of $282,000 and Decedent's Estate H has no liability. See Appendix.
190. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
191. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975).
192. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 5-17 to 29 at 79-114
(1978).
Two Pennsylvania cases illustrate the difficulty of meeting
standing requirements in a challenge to the estate tax. In Knowle's
Estate, 193 the claimant owned property located solely within the
state. 194 His complaint alleged that the tax violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Although the trial court and
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court each addressed the merits of the
challenge in dicta, both concluded that the estate lacked standing to
challenge the tax.' 95 Two reasons account for the estate's failure to
achieve standing. First, the estate consisted solely of Pennsylvania
property and thus was not within the zone of interest protected by
the due process clause. 196 Consequently, the estate could not assert
that the statute exceeded the power of the state by imposing a tax on
property beyond its jurisdiction because the estate had no such prop-
erty. In addition, neither court found injury to the estate. If in fact
the estate tax was unconstitutional and the court did strike it, the
estate would realize no gain. The estate still would be liable for an
identical amount of tax, the only difference being that payment
would go to the federal government. 97
In the second illustrative case, 98 the executor had similar
problems obtaining standing. Although in this instance the estate
did consist of out-of-state property, the plaintiff failed to prove that
infirmities in the estate tax caused the alleged harm.' 99 The estate
had not claimed the maximum allowed federal credit for state death
taxes on its federal estate tax return. By the time Pennsylvania sub-
sequently assessed the estate tax, the period during which an estate
could claim the credit on the federal return had expired. 200 The trial
court held that the estate's negligence in failing to claim the credit,
rather than the statute, produced harm.20  Furthermore, even if the
tax violated Pennsylvania's uniformity provision, no injury resulted.
Adopting the Knowles rationale, the court concluded that any
amount refunded by striking the tax statute simply would go to the
federal government and, therefore, no economic injury resulted from
193. 295 Pa. 571, 145 A. 797 (1929).
194. Id The federal estate on Knowle's property was approximately $99,000, the Penn-
sylvania inheritance tax was $32,000, and the federal credit was $79,000. The additional Penn-
sylvania estate tax assessed against the estate equalled $47,000.
195. Id; Knowles' Estate, II Pa. D. & C. 621 (D.C. Phila. 1929).
196. Cf. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940). The test of a state's
power to "is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return."
197. But cf. In re Markle's Estate, 311 Pa. 472, 166 A. 844 (1933) in which there was no
indication that the federal government would collect the estate tax if Pennsylvania did not.
198. Baker's Estate, I Pa. Fiduc. 2d 414 (Orphan's Ct., Allegheny County 1980), aff'dper
curiam, reh'g denied, 495 Pa. 337, 433 A.2d 1667 (1981).
199. Baker's estate, consisting of property in both Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, had
paid $1644 in inheritance tax to Massachusetts.
200. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
201. Baker's Estate, I Pa. Fiduc. 2d 414 (Orphan's Ct., Allegheny County 1980), a5'dper
curiam, reh'g denied, 495 Pa. 337, 433 A.2d 1337 (1981).
imposition of the tax.2° 2
A. Standing Under the Fourteenth Amendment Challenge
Courts have characterized the interest protected by the due pro-
cess clause as the right of a property owner to have tangible personal
or real property taxed only by the state in which the property has an
actual situs. 20 3 Thus, an estate asserting a due process violation must
consist of multistate property because only then can the jurisdic-
tional excess of an estate tax be shown. Fulfilling this requirement
would satisfy the zone of interests test.
A litigant easily would meet the injury requirement if an estate's
tax liability to Pennsylvania is greater than comparable liability
under the Treichler HI approved formula.2°  For instance, the Fas-
ken estate obtained standing by showing this type of dichotomy.20 5
Consequently, the argument advanced in Knowles, that an estate still
would have the same tax liability, has no application when an estate
incurs multistate tax liability in excess of the federal credit.2" By
applying Treichler I for comparison, an estate can establish the
causal connection between the injury and the violation of the interest
protected by due process.20 7 Conversely, states that properly appor-
tion the credit, following due process guidelines, eliminate economic
injury. 208 Thus, a decedent's estate containing multistate property
can achieve standing to assert a due process challenge to the Penn-
sylvania estate tax.
202. Massachusetts, at the time of the decedent Baker's death, had an additional estate tax
utilizing the federal credit as its base. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 65 C, §§ 1-4 (West Supp.
1983). If Baker's estate had paid this tax, the state would not have granted a corresponding
credit under the Pennsylvania estate tax. Thus, the estate would have been liable for a double
tax burden and, arguably, could have established standing.
203. See Frick v. Pennsylvania, 263 U.S. 473 (1925).
204. An estate can establish standing if
(Taxable Pennsylvania Property) x (Federal Credit for State Death Taxes)
(Federal Gross Estate)
is less than (Federal Credit for State Death Taxes) - (All State Death Taxes Recognized by
Pennsylvania).
205. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
206. See Decedent's Estate E in Appendix. Because Pennsylvania disregards the Florida
tax in calculating estate tax, the estate owes Pennsylvania $160,400 under § 2485-421. If the
Treichler H formula is applied to Decedent's Estate E, however, the estate would have a tax
due of only $20,000:
$4,000,000 x $280,400 - $120,000 = $20,000.
$4,000,000
207. If in Decedent's Estate E the court declares that the Pensylvania estate tax is uncon-
stitutional, the estate would owe the federal government only $20,200.
208. Decedent's Estate E would pay $120,000 in Pennsylvania inheritance taxes, $20,200
in Pennsylvania estate taxes, and $140,200 in Florida taxes for a total of $280,400, the value of
the federal credit.
B. Standing to Assert the Uniformity Challenge
The Pennsylvania estate tax results in an inequality of tax bur-
dens on decedent's estates.20 9 If a litigant can establish that other
estates of identical value pay varying amounts of tax for the same
privilege,210 that estate falls within the zone of interest protected by
the uniformity provision. The real difficulty in achieving standing
lies in establishing the injury requirement.
When an estate consists of property located wholly within Penn-
sylvania, application of the statute does not result in increased tax
liability.2 ' The statute merely dictates that the estate pay to the
state that money which otherwise would revert to the federal govern-
ment. The unique nature of the federal credit appears to set up an
impenetrable barrier to challenges based upon a violation of the uni-
212formity provision. Even when the estate consists of multistate
property and comparison to the Treichler II computation evidences
an injury, the estate probably will not have standing to assert the
uniformity challenge. Again, difficulty arises not in showing that the
tax is nonuniform, but in establishing the injury that results from its
imposition. Because the tax due the state apparently would be paid
to the federal government in any event,21 3 a taxpayer cannot estab-
lish the causal connection between the infirmity of the statute and
any injury sustained by the estate on uniformity grounds.214 Thus,
although patently nonuniform, Pennsylvania's estate tax should sur-
vive any challenge based on the violation of the uniformity
provision.
VII. Concluf ion
The Pennsylvania estate tax violates both the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment and the uniformity provision of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. Consequently, a restructuring of the
Pennsylvania estate tax is necessary. A Treichler HI approach would
satisfy the dictates of the fourteenth amendment but any tax based
on the federal credit would not conform to the uniformity provision.
209. See supra notes 178-89 and accompanying text.
210. Compare Decedents' Estates B, G and H with D in Appendix.
211. See Decedent's Estate B in Appendix. Total death taxes paid to Pennsylvania equals
the federal credit.
212. For example, assume that, in the case of Decedent's Estate B in the Appendix, the
statute was struck because it violated uniformity. The estate still would have an estate tax
liability of $240,000. The estate would be required to pay the $40,400 in "savings" to the
federal government since the estate can receive only the lesser of death taxes paid or the maxi-
mum federal credit.
213. Compare Decedents' Estates B and D in the Appendix. B clearly can show a larger
Pennsylvania death tax liability than D. Even if the court accepted higher liability as a viola-
tion of uniformity, B still would be liable for the same total amount of taxes (federal and
Pennsylvania) as in supra note 212.
214. See Baker's Estate, I Pa. Fiduc. 2d 414 (Orhpan's Ct. Allegheny County 1980).
Considering the unlikely prospects of a challenge succeeding on this
ground, the uniformity violation probably will play no role in any
reformulation of the tax. Allocating a portion of the credit to Penn-
sylvania, as delineated in the estate tax on nonresidents of the
United States, however, would bring the tax within due process
guidelines. A beneficial side effect of this formulation may be an
increase in revenue to the state under certain circumstances. 215 This
benefit alone may be sufficient to motivate the Pennsylvania General
Assembly to bring the estate tax in line with due process require-
ments. Estates consisting of multistate property then would be sub-
ject to a far more equitable tax burden.
VINCENT V. CARISSIMI
215. Examine Decedent's Estate F in the Appendix. If Pennsylvania employed a Treichler
H formula for computing the estate tax, instead of realizing only $120,000 in revenue, Penn-
sylvania would receive an additional $20,200 for a total of $140,200:
( $2000000 x $280,400)- $120,000 = $20,200.
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